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Abstract
Exogenously imposed infinite repetition is known to mitigate people’s uncooperative 
behaviors in dilemma situations with partner matching through personal enforce-
ment. One as yet unanswered question is whether people collectively choose to inter-
act with each other under the partner matching condition when there exists an alter-
native possibility under random matching. In an indefinitely repeated public goods 
game framework, I let subjects democratically choose whether to (1) play with pre-
assigned specific others for all rounds or to (2) play with randomly matched counter-
parts in every round. The experimental results revealed that most groups collectively 
opt for the partner matching protocol. The data also indicated that groups achieve 
a higher level of cooperation when they democratically select the partner matching 
protocol by voting, relative to when the same option is exogenously imposed. These 
findings imply that people’s equilibrium selection may be affected by how the basic 
rules of games are introduced (endogenously or exogenously). The paper provides 
further evidence to suggest that the positive effect of democratic decision-making 
is stronger when the majority voting rule, rather than the unanimity rule, is applied.
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1 Introduction
Collective action dilemmas, in which free riding is a strictly dominant strategy but 
mutual cooperation leads to a Pareto optimum, are ubiquitous in our real lives. A 
rich body of theoretical and experimental work has put considerable efforts into 
exploring how to overcome people’s uncooperative behaviors in such dilemma situa-
tions. One of the most established behavioral findings during the last several decades 
is that people contribute to public goods to some degree even in one-shot games or 
in earlier rounds of repeated dilemma games (e.g., Ledyard 1995; Chaudhuri 2011). 
However, people cannot achieve high levels of cooperation in the absence of an 
institution that facilitates cooperation, such as peer-to-peer monetary or non-mon-
etary punishment opportunities (e.g., Fehr and Gächter 2000; Masclet et al. 2003), 
because of serious tensions between cooperation and non-cooperation.
An important finding from research on dilemmas is that a person’s decision to 
cooperate can be significantly altered if the game involves infinite repetition (the 
possibility to repeatedly interact with the same players until an unknown time period 
in the future). Theoretically, mutual cooperation, in addition to mutual defection, 
holds as an equilibrium outcome with partner matching through personal enforce-
ment if the agents are sufficiently patient. Experimental tests for the theory of infi-
nitely repeated games can be conducted using indefinitely repeated setups with a 
random continuation rule (Roth and Murnighan 1978). In previous studies, the evo-
lution of cooperation has frequently been tested by using prisoner’s dilemma games. 
Results from these past experiments show that when the partner matching protocol 
is used, indefinite repetition can indeed encourage people to behave more coopera-
tively under some conditions, compared with environments in which players know 
the precise length of the repeated games and mutual defection is the unique equi-
librium (e.g., Roth and Murnighan 1978; Murnighan and Roth 1983; Feinberg and 
Husted 1993; Dal Bó 2005; Duffy and Ochs 2009; Dal Bó and Fréchette 2011).1 
However, not everyone chooses to cooperate in many cases even under indefinite 
repetition. For instance, in Dal Bó (2005) the average cooperation rates range from 
20 to 50% across almost all treatments even when prisoner’s dilemma games are 
indefinitely repeated. In Dal Bó and Fréchette (2011), cooperation does not evolve 
even with experience if the mutual cooperation outcome is only sub-game perfect 
but a cooperative action is not risk-dominant. Dal Bó and Fréchette (2011) further 
show that cooperation does not always evolve even when cooperation is a risk-dom-
inant equilibrium action.
One possible channel that may boost cooperation in the partner matching environ-
ment is a process in which players themselves collectively decide to play with each 
1 See Dal Bó and Fréchette (2018) for a survey. There are also some experiments that showed that indefi-
nite repetition did not increase the level of cooperation compared with in finitely repeated environments 
(e.g., Lugovskyy et al. 2015).
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other under that matching protocol. In all the experiments listed above, the partner 
matching protocol was exogenously given to subjects by the experimenters. Demo-
cratic decision-making may, however, encourage subjects to select a strategy that 
leads to a high level of cooperation (and accordingly a high level of payoff) through 
signaling effects and the so-called democracy premium. The democracy premium is 
defined as the impact that democratic decision-making directly has on people’s pref-
erences and beliefs (excluding any instrumental effects it may have, such as selec-
tion bias and the effects of information).
This paper undertakes a two-step approach to study the impact of democracy in 
the context of infinitely repeated games. In the first step, I set up a random match-
ing protocol (where people’s interaction partners change from round to round) as an 
alternative option and then let groups select one protocol, partner or random match-
ing. After that I identify the impact of democracy. People’s collective choice of a 
matching protocol is an interesting question in itself, not only theoretically but also 
empirically. From a theoretical perspective, prior work has demonstrated that with 
infinite repetition, community enforcement can sustain cooperation if agents are suf-
ficiently patient, even with random matching (e.g., Kandori, 1992; Ellison, 1994). 
Recent experimental literature in this area also shows that indefinite repetition may 
encourage people to cooperate even if no information regarding their interaction 
partners’ past action choices is available.2 Nevertheless, mutual cooperation is theo-
retically easier to achieve with partner matching rather than with random match-
ing, because a higher degree of patience (a higher discounting factor) is required 
for players to choose cooperation in the latter matching protocol. One may won-
der whether, given a choice, subjects select the partner matching protocol with the 
aim of obtaining high payoffs through the emergence of strong cooperation norms. 
From the perspective of experimental research, there is also evidence from finitely 
repeated games to suggest that subjects achieve comparatively higher cooperation 
norms and payoffs under the partner matching, because repetition adds strategic 
incentives to cooperate [see, e.g., Fehr and Schurtenberger (2018) for a survey].3,4 
Nevertheless, to my knowledge, people’s collective choices between the partner and 
random matching protocols remains hitherto unexplored. This paper is the first to 
study people’s collective choices between the partner versus random matching pro-
tocol and then to study the consequences of its endogenous adoption of the partner 
matching protocol using a laboratory experiment.
2 Experimental results with random matching are rather mixed and a consensus has not been established 
yet. While Camera and Casari (2009) found a positive impact of indefinite repetition, Duffy and Ochs 
(2009) and the N treatment in Kamei (2017) found no impact. There are also conflicting results from past 
studies for the impact of indefinite repetition when some information on interaction partners is disclosed. 
While Camera and Casari (2009), Stahl (2013) and Kamei (2017) found that cooperation evolved with 
reputational information, Duffy and Ochs (2009) found that it did not do so.
3 Also see Gächter et al. (2017) who recently showed that subjects’ reputation building motives under 
the partner matching protocol are much larger in the provision (rather than maintenance) of a public 
good—which is the setup of my framework.
4 Even in a finitely repeated dilemma game, theoretically people can sustain cooperation if a sufficiently 
large fraction of them believe that the peers are acting on non-standard strategies, such as the tit-for-tat 
strategy (Kreps et al. 1982).
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Examples where people collectively decide whether to form explicit groups (high 
continuation probabilities) or not (low continuation probabilities) are frequently 
observed, especially in small-group interactions. For example, charitable or volun-
tary groups that aim to improve the lives of the poor in a community may form and 
collectively decide to work together for an indefinite amount of time. Other exam-
ples include student groups that act for purposes such as environment protection, 
sports and political activities. These student groups are often active over an unde-
fined time horizon. Do people prefer to continuously work with the same peers, or 
engage in activities without establishing such groupings? Does a collectively-made 
decision to interact together affect people’s level of cooperation? Further, consider 
international organizations, such as the United Nations. These organizations are 
formed by countries that share a common vision (e.g., poverty alleviation) and the 
member countries carry out missions together to achieve a common goal. The com-
position of these member countries is fairly stable and members thus face a higher 
continuation probability when making decisions together, compared with when they 
act without being a member of such an organization. While I acknowledge that the 
use of the random matching protocol (an environment with a continuation probabil-
ity of zero in which subjects are randomly assigned to a group and then interact with 
each other only once in each round) as an alternative may not perfectly capture these 
real-world situations, this protocol can approximate a broad range of the settings 
mentioned above. The simplest setup then, with two extreme choice sets (partner 
versus random matching), enables us to parsimoniously capture certain phenomena 
of theoretical interest.
Recent studies on endogenous choices of institutions can inform on subjects’ 
possible voting behaviors. The literature, however, provides conflicting evidence 
and implies different behaviors. On the one hand, subjects may vote for the part-
ner matching protocol because votes are known to be significantly affected by their 
material concerns (e.g., Kamei et  al. 2015; Putterman et  al. 2011). As discussed, 
subjects’ levels of contributions are known to be higher in the partner matching 
than in the random matching protocol. Subjects may also select the partner match-
ing protocol if democratic choice serves as a signal that members will cooperate 
with other group members in the supergame (e.g., Tyran and Feld 2006) because 
the high incentives to free ride under the random matching protocol are sacrificed 
(e.g., Aimone et al. 2013; Grimm and Mengel 2009). Alternatively, voting in favor 
of playing together may serve as an opportunity to indirectly persuade those who 
initially did not plan to cooperate away from defection (e.g., Cooper et  al. 1992; 
Blume and Ortmann 2007).5 These voting functions may improve cooperation fur-
ther. Possible democracy premiums may also make partner matching more attractive 
to subjects (e.g., Dal Bó et al. 2010; Kamei 2016; Sutter et al. 2010; Tyran and Feld 
2006).
5 The “hit-and-run” strategy (i.e., defect and then escape from the current group members) is possible 
with the random matching protocol.
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On the other hand, Dal Bó et al. (2017) recently demonstrated that voters tend 
to underappreciate equilibrium effects when evaluating alternatives. In my con-
text, voters may mistakenly believe that cooperation is still difficult to achieve with 
partner matching and that they may remain stuck in a matching with less-coop-
erative partners if the partner matching protocol is in effect. This misperception 
may increase the attractiveness of the random matching protocol to subjects. Nev-
ertheless, while in Dal Bó et al. (2017) the payoff matrix of the stage game differs 
between the two voting options, I use the same stage game structure for the two 
voting choices and only vary the matching protocols. Thus, arguably less cognitive 
loads would be required to evaluate equilibrium effects in my study than in Dal 
Bó et al. (2017). Subjects may hence quickly learn to select the partner matching 
protocol.
In addition to the contribution to the literature on democratic choices, this study 
also contributes to the research agenda on endogenous group formation and part-
ner choice. Cooperation is known to be more likely to evolve in dilemma games 
with fixed group size, if individuals are provided with both an ability to choose 
with whom they interact and sufficient information on other players’ past behav-
iors (e.g., Coricelli et al. 2004; Page et al. 2005; Kamei and Putterman 2017). The 
evolution of cooperation is also likely to be seen in dilemma games with vari-
able group size (by voting with your feet) when entry to a new group requires the 
group members’ agreement (e.g., Ahn et al. 2008; Charness and Chun-Lei 2014), 
or when peer-to-peer sanctioning institutions are present (e.g., Gürerk et al. 2006; 
Nicklisch et al. 2016; Fehr and Williams 2018). None of these studies, however, 
focused on identifying the impact of democracy. Instead, they examined other 
factors, such as the beneficial effects of competition for trustworthy partners and 
subjects’ reputation building behaviors. In contrast, the direct effect of democracy 
in selecting to play with fixed partners may itself partly account for the positive 
evidence.
I use a linear public goods game framework (also known as voluntary contribu-
tion mechanism). In groups of four, each subject is given a fixed endowment and 
decides simultaneously how much to contribute to their group in every round. I 
design three treatments: one for the control condition and the other two for the 
treatment conditions. The three treatments are identical, except for the implementa-
tion process of the matching protocols. In the control condition, subjects play the 
public good game indefinitely with three fixed individuals and no agreement pro-
cedure is available. By contrast, in the treatment conditions, subjects are randomly 
assigned to groups with three individuals at the onset, and then each group demo-
cratically decides whether they want to play the public goods game with each other 
(i) for all rounds subject to a random continuation rule or (ii) for one round only. 
Option (i) is a standard partner matching condition, whereas option (ii) is a stand-
ard random matching condition. If a group selects option (ii), the group is dissolved 
after the one-time interaction. In the following round, subjects will be randomly 
re-matched with three individuals from groups that selected option (ii), and play 
the one-shot public goods game. This process—dissolution, random matching and 
 K. Kamei 
1 3
one-shot public goods game—continues with a fixed probability (the random con-
tinuation rule). Experimental parameters are set so that (a) contributing nothing for 
the group is a strictly dominant strategy if the stage game is played just once but (b) 
if the stage game is infinitely repeated it becomes a coordination game (where any 
symmetric, positive contribution situation is sustained as an equilibrium outcome). 
The two treatment conditions differ by voting rule: unanimity rule or majority 
rule. Under the unanimity rule, subjects repeat voting until they reach a consensus. 
Agreement procedures in some real interactions use unanimity rules (including the 
small-group interactions mentioned in the above examples, and various decisions 
made by international organizations such as the United Nations and by political 
unions such as the European Union). Some past experimental studies on the impact 
of democratic decision-making have modeled democratic processes by using simi-
lar unanimity rules, including Sutter et  al. (2010). Under the majority rule, sub-
jects cast votes once, and whichever protocol that receives at least three votes is 
implemented in a group. A majority rule is also widely used form of democratic 
decision-making and is also adopted in past experiments on democracy, including 
Dal Bó et al. (2010), Tyran and Feld (2006) and Kamei (2016). As all the design 
aspects except the voting rule are identical for the three treatments, I can also pro-
vide new evidence about the difference in the impact of democracy between the 
two voting rules.
The experiment reveals that, first, almost all groups choose the partner matching 
protocol by voting. This is consistent with the theory that sustaining a high level of 
cooperation is easier in the partner matching than in the random matching proto-
col. Second, regardless of whether the unanimity or majority rule is used, subjects 
contribute significantly more in the treatment conditions, compared with subjects 
in the control condition, where the same partner matching protocol is exogenously 
imposed on them. A detailed analysis suggests that the positive effect of voting is 
not due to selection effects (e.g., Tyran and Feld 2006; Dal Bó et al. 2010, 2015) 
but can be partly explained by higher beliefs formed by subjects in the treatment 
conditions, consistent with the idea of the signaling hypothesis (e.g., Tyran and Feld 
2006) or of democracy premiums. This result implies that democratic decision-mak-
ing may significantly affect subjects’ equilibrium selection in an infinitely repeated 
public goods game by influencing their beliefs. Yet there is an interesting difference 
between the two voting rules: the impact of democracy is stronger when the major-
ity, rather than the unanimity, rule is used. The strong impact of democracy per-
sists within supergames under the majority rule, whereas the effect diminishes from 
round to round within supergames under the unanimity rule. There is also a clear 
sign of democracy premium on subjects’ contribution behaviors under the majority 
rule: we observe positive impact on subjects’ decision to contribute even after con-
trolling for their beliefs.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows: Sect.  2 describes the experimen-
tal design. Section  3 briefly provides theoretical considerations. Section  4 reports 
results, and Sect. 5 concludes.
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2  Experimental design
The design frame is an indefinitely repeated public goods game. The group size 
is four. Subjects play the indefinitely repeated game five times in each treat-
ment.6 The repeated supergame design was chosen, instead of a one-shot super-
game design, to explore how people’s collective choices change from supergame 
to supergame and how the impact of democracy persists over time. I employ a 
standard random matching protocol across the supergames, i.e., at the onset of 
each supergame group compositions are randomly changed. The duration of each 
supergame is stochastically determined. I set the random continuation probability 
as 75% (e.g., Dal Bó 2005): subjects in the tth round of a given supergame will 
play the next round (i.e., round t + 1) with a probability of 75% (the supergame 
ends with a probability of 25%). The expected length of subjects’ interactions is 
therefore 4 (= 1/(1 − 0.75)) rounds in each supergame. This feature of stochastic 
determination of the game duration is common knowledge to all subjects.
The experiment consists of two endogenous treatments, denoted as the “Endog-
enous, Unanimity” (ENDO-U) and “Endogenous, Majority” (ENDO-M) treat-
ments, and one exogenous treatment, denoted as the “Exogenous” (EXO) treatment 
(Table 1). I adopt a between-subjects design, rather than a within-subjects design, 
because democratic decision-making may affect subjects’ behaviors beyond the 
environment where subjects make decisions. This indirect effect of democratic deci-
sion-making is defined as the spill-over effect of democracy in Kamei (2016). Thus, 
we obtain cleaner data if we divide subjects into independent treatment and control 
groups and then let them play the game under only one condition than otherwise.
This paper’s empirical strategies to identify the impact of democratic decision-
making are as follows:
Strategy a To compare subjects’ action choices in the 1st supergame between two 
treatments but use only the rounds that occurred in all sessions of the 1st super-
game in the two treatments.
Strategy b To compare subjects’ action choices in all supergames between the two 
treatments but use only the rounds that occurred in all sessions in the two treatments.
The strategies to compare subjects’ behaviors in the common rounds between 
two treatments are employed because each supergame likely has a different length 
by session due to the random continuation rule. The data would not be compara-
ble between sessions (and accordingly between the two treatments) if we use the 
complete dataset. With strategies a and b, we most likely use the first round of 
each supergame to study the impact of democracy. Since I use the continuation 
probability of 75%, the probability that at least two rounds occur in all sessions 
of two treatments for a comparison is: (0.75)K × 100[%], where K is the number 
of sessions. As will be explained in Sect. 4, there are three sessions per treatment. 
6 The term “phase” was used in the experiment to refer to indefinitely repeated game.
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Thus, K = 6. Hence, the probability that at least two rounds are realized during a 
given supergame in all the sessions in the ENDO-U and EXO treatments, or in 
the ENDO-M and EXO treatments, is very low—only 17.8% (= (0.75)6 × 100).
I perform analyses using strategy a, in addition to using strategy b, because 
data in the first supergame is cleaner than that of the 2nd to 5th supergames. Sub-
jects’ experiences in the first supergame would differ by session due to the ran-
dom continuation rule. The difference in subjects’ experiences in earlier super-
games may affect their contribution and voting behaviors in the later supergames. 
I now explain each design aspect one by one.
2.1  The stage game
The stage game used in the experiment is a linear public goods game. In every 
round, subjects are each given an endowment of 20 points, and they simultaneously 
decide how to allocate it between their private and public accounts. The contribution 
amount must be an integer between 0 and 20. The sum of allocations to the private 
account and the public account must be 20 points. For each point that a subject allo-
cates to her private account, she obtains one point as her payoff without affecting the 
payoffs of her group members. For each point she allocates to her public account, 
she and her three partners each obtain Marginal Per Capita Return (MPCR) = 0.4 
points as payoffs. In summary, when subject i contributes Ci,t to the public account 
in round t, she obtains the following payoff:
where r = 0.4 (MPCR) and N = 4 in this study. Note that 1/N < r < 1.
2.2  The treatment conditions
In the ENDO-U treatment, after subjects are randomly assigned to a group of four 
in each supergame, they select a matching protocol by voting (Fig.  1a). The vot-
ing option is either partner matching (a continuation probability of 0.75) or random 
matching (a continuation probability of 0.00).7 The collective decision is made by a 
unanimity rule: four members of a group continue to vote until all members vote for 
the same option. The maximum number of the voting stages is 20.8 In the case that 
the four members do not agree on one option in the 20th voting stage, a majority 
rule is applied to determine the group’s choice.9
In the ENDO-M treatment, subjects vote only once between the two matching 
protocols in each supergame. Whichever protocol receives at least three votes is 
(1)20 − Ci,t + r
N∑
j=1
Cj,t,
7 The two options were called “all periods in a given phase” and “one period” in the experiment.
8 The maximum number of voting stages is set in order to avoid the duration of the experiment being too 
long.
9 When votes are split equally between the two options in the 20th vote, one of them is randomly (i.e., 
with a probability of 50%) selected by the computer.
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implemented in the group. In case of a tie, the computer selects one of the two pro-
tocols with a probability of 50% in that group.
If a group selects the partner matching protocol, then the four subjects interact 
with each other until the end of a given supergame. By contrast, if the group selects 
the random matching protocol, their interaction is one-shot. All groups that selected 
the random matching protocol are dissolved after the one-shot interaction. They are 
then randomly assigned to new groups of four among them and play the game with 
the three new peers once. The process of dissolution, random re-matching and one-
shot public goods game repeats with a continuation probability of 75%.10
2.3  The control condition
In the EXO treatment, subjects have no opportunity to select a matching protocol. 
Instead, subjects are instructed that they will play with three pre-assigned members 
under partner matching in a given supergame (Fig. 1b).11
2.4  Elicitation of beliefs
As an additional analysis, I elicit subjects’ beliefs in order to examine the motivation 
behind subjects’ decisions to contribute.12 Specifically, in the ENDO-U and ENDO-
M treatments, after the voting stage and before moving on to the sequence of alloca-
tion stages, all subjects are asked about beliefs on the average contribution amount 
to the public account by their interaction peers during a given supergame. Likewise, 
subjects in the EXO treatment are also asked to state their beliefs on their interaction 
peers’ average contribution amount before each supergame commences.
10 If the number of groups that selected the random matching protocol is only one, then the four group 
members interact with each other for all rounds in the given supergame because there are no other groups 
to be dissolved. As an anonymous referee pointed out, this design aspect could affect subjects’ behav-
iors if they realize that the number of groups that selected the random matching is sufficiently small 
because then the random matching becomes almost equivalent to the partner matching. Nevertheless, it 
is unlikely that this concern biased subjects’ decisions in the experiment for the following two reasons. 
First, as will be explained in Sect. 4.1, most groups selected the partner matching protocol from the first 
supergame. Second, subjects were not informed how many groups selected the random matching proto-
col. As shown in Sect. 4.2, subjects’ contribution behaviors were significantly different between the part-
ner and random matching protocols. This suggests that subjects would likely have perceived the random 
matching protocol as different from the partner matching protocol.
11 I acknowledge that there are other ways to design the control treatment. For instance, another possible 
way would be to assign each matching protocol stochastically to control groups with the actual percent-
ages of groups which selected each option in the ENDO-U or ENDO-M treatment, without informing 
subjects of the percentages of stochastic implementation. I did not employ this method because subjects 
in the ENDO-U and ENDO-M treatments were able to guess the likelihood of these matching proto-
cols being selected to some degree as their votes determine collective choices. Alternatively, we could 
stochastically impose one of the two matching protocols on control groups while notifying subjects the 
percentages of stochastic determination. However, this control treatment design is not perfect either con-
sidering that subjects in the ENDO-U and ENDO-M treatments are not given the information as to how 
many groups select the partner or random matching protocol.
12 The importance of beliefs when subjects choose actions has been experimentally demonstrated in 
finitely repeated setups (e.g., Selten and Stoecker 1986; Andreoni and Miller 1993; Kamei and Putterman 
2017).
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I note that the belief elicitation task is not incentivized in order to minimize its 
effects on subjects’ action choices because this paper’s first priority is on subjects’ 
voting and their actual contribution behaviors.13 Possible side effects of incentivized 
(a) The ENDO-U and ENDO-M treatments  
(b) The EXO treatment 
….
….
….
….
25%
25%
1st round
75%
2. Voting: 
(a) ENDO-U treatment: subjects 
vote up to 20 times [unanimity rule]
(b) ENDO-M treatment: subjects 
vote once [majority rule]
SG tSG t − 1
3. Elicitation of beliefs on 
average contribution amounts 
of group members in the 
present supergame
1. Random group 
assignment
4. Public goods games with (a) three fixed players [partner matching]
or (b) randomly changing three players [random matching] in SG t
2nd round
SG t is over. Subjects move on to SG t + 1
75%
3rd round
SG t is over. Subjects move on to SG t + 1
25%
75%
4th round
SG t is over. Subjects move on to SG t + 1
25%
25%
1st round
75%
SG tSG t − 1
2. Elicitation of beliefs on 
average contribution amounts 
of group members in the 
present supergame
1. Random group assignment
3. Public goods games with three fixed players [partner matching]
2nd round
SG t is over. Subjects move on to SG t + 1
75%
3rd round
SG t is over. Subjects move on to SG t + 1
25%
75%
4th round
SG t is over. Subjects move on to SG t + 1
Fig. 1  Experimental design
13 See Sections (d) and (e) in Supplementary Appendix A for computer screen images for this elicitation 
task.
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belief elicitation methods have been documented [see, for example, Gächter and 
Renner (2010) for the detail].14
3  Theoretical considerations on subjects’ behaviors
The standard theory does not provide a point prediction in the experiment. In the EXO 
treatment, not only the mutual free-riding but also any symmetric, positive contribu-
tion situation holds as an equilibrium outcome since I adopt 0.75 as a continuation 
probability. To illustrate a possibility of the mutual full contribution equilibrium in this 
control treatment, suppose that all four individuals in a group have contributed the full 
endowment amounts (E) to the public account before round t and have been and will 
be using a grim trigger strategy. That is, a subject i contributes E points until she sees 
at least one instance of defection where one of the individuals in her group contributes 
less than E; once i faces the defection she starts contributing zero points until the end 
of a given supergame. In this situation, if subject i continues to follow the grim trigger 
strategy in and after round t, her expected payoff ( E[휋i] ) is calculated as:
where E =20, r is the MPCR (= 0.4), N is group size (= 4) and 훿 is the continuation 
probability (= 0.75). Alternatively, if she changes her strategy and contributes zero 
points in round t, her expected payoff is maximized by also contributing zero points 
in any round after round t because the other three players will contribute zeros as 
they are following the grim trigger strategy. The maximum payoff is thus calculated 
as:
which is less than the mutual full contribution payoff in Eq. (2). It is therefore not 
materially beneficial for i to deviate from the mutual full contribution situation. Note 
that the threshold value of δ so that the mutual full contribution situation can be sup-
ported as an equilibrium outcome is 0.5, which is much less than 0.75.
There also exists a symmetric, positive, but less-than-full-contribution equilib-
rium for any contribution level ξ ∊ {1, 2, …, E} in the EXO treatment. The existence 
(2)Et[휋i]cooperate =
∞∑
s=t
훿s−t ⋅ 휋i,s(ci,s) =
r ⋅ N ⋅ E
1 − 훿
= 128,
(3)
Et[휋i]
defect = E − 0 + r ⋅ (N − 1) ⋅ E +
∞∑
s=t+1
훿s−t ⋅ 휋i,s(ci,s) = 44 +
훿 ⋅ E
1 − 훿
= 104,
14 Gächter and Renner (2010) let subjects play a finitely repeated linear public goods game with the 
same experimental parameters as this paper (the per-subject endowment is 20 points and the MPCR is 
0.4). Their results indicated that although elicited beliefs were more accurate when they were incentiv-
ized than when they were not incentivized, the mean difference was only 0.59 points, and that the incen-
tivized elicitation significantly influenced subjects’ decision to contribute. If subjects’ beliefs were not 
incentivized, by contrast, their contribution amounts were not significantly different from those in a treat-
ment where beliefs were not elicited. Gächter and Renner (2010) suggest that “If the researcher is afraid 
that belief elicitation leads to behavioral results that he or she would not obtain when not asking for 
beliefs, then […] belief elicitation should not be incentivized” (page 372).
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of such an equilibrium can be checked with the same logic that assumes the sub-
jects’ grim trigger strategy. With the symmetric contribution equilibrium with the 
contribution level of ξ points, subject i obtains a payoff as in Eq. (4):
If subject i, by contrast, contributes zero points to the public account in a given 
round, she obtains the following as maximum payoff:
Equations  (4) and (5) suggest that Et[𝜋i]continue to contribute ξ points > Et[𝜋i]defect , 
regardless of the value of 휉 , if δ > 0.5.15 We also see that Eq. (4) is monotonically 
increasing in the symmetric contribution level ξ. In other words, the strategic situa-
tion that subjects face is the one with Pareto-ranked multiple equilibria.
The same holds true also for groups that select the partner matching protocol in 
the ENDO-U and ENDO-M treatments. These groups face the same strategic situa-
tion with Pareto-ranked multiple equilibria.
Summary 1: Not only the mutual full free-riding situation, but also any sym-
metric, positive contribution situation holds as an equilibrium outcome in the EXO 
treatment. Subjects in groups that implemented the partner matching protocol in the 
ENDO-U and ENDO-M treatments face the same strategic situation as the subjects 
in the EXO treatment.
Subjects have stronger incentives to defect in groups where the random matching 
protocol is implemented because they can hit and run, considering that the respec-
tive groups will be dissolved after a given round and they may be matched with 
subjects from other groups in the following rounds. Following the logic of Kandori 
(1992), however, one instance of defection can spread very quickly to other subjects 
in groups with the random matching protocol if each subject employs a grim trigger 
strategy. Due to this contagion process, the symmetric, positive contribution situ-
ation with any level ξ ∈ {1, 2, …, E}, including the mutual full contribution situ-
ation, can be sustained as an equilibrium outcome. Incentives to defect depend on 
how many groups selected the random matching protocol. Taking an extreme exam-
ple to illustrate, suppose that there are 24 subjects in the experiment and that all of 
the six groups selected the random matching protocol. As will be explained later, 
the number of groups per session was either five or six in the experiment. Because 
the incentive to defect is largest in this extreme situation, if the symmetric positive 
(4)Et[휋i]continue to contribute ξ points =
∞∑
s=t
훿s−t ⋅ 휋i,s(휉) =
E − 휉 + r ⋅ N ⋅ 휉
1 − 훿
.
(5)
Et[휋i]
defect = E − 0 + r ⋅ (N − 1) ⋅ 휉 +
∞∑
s=t+1
훿s−t ⋅ 휋i,s(0)
= E + r ⋅ (N − 1)휉 +
훿E
1 − 훿
.
15 The threshold δ is decreasing in the size of N and also in the size of r.
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contribution situations can be supported as equilibrium outcomes in this situation, 
there is clearly no incentive for subject i to deviate from the grim trigger strategy 
when the number of groups that selected the random matching protocol is less than 
six. As calculated in Appendix B, even in this extreme situation, when subject i con-
tributes less than ξ points in round t, the percentage of full free-riders out of the 
other 23 subjects reaches around 90% by round t + 3, even if the 23 subjects have 
contributed ξ points until round t. Due to the rapid contagion of free-riding, the total 
expected payoff from defection is lower than the mutual cooperation payoff, which 
is (E − ξ + r·N·ξ)/(1 − δ). This means that i has no incentive to deviate and thus any 
symmetric contribution situation holds as an equilibrium outcome. These considera-
tions are summarized as follows:
Summary 2: Regardless of how many groups select the random matching proto-
col, both mutual full free-riding situation and any symmetric, positive contribution 
situation (including the mutual full contribution situation) hold as equilibrium out-
comes when the random matching protocol is implemented in a given supergame.
Despite the theoretical analyses contained in Summary 1 and Summary 2, we 
would expect that the symmetric contribution equilibrium for a given contribution 
level (ξ points) is more easily attained when the partner matching protocol, rather 
than the random matching protocol, is selected. This is because, with random match-
ing, the threshold value of continuation probabilities above which the mutual contri-
bution holds as an equilibrium outcome ( 훿random ) is greater than or equal to that with 
partner matching ( 훿partner = 0.5 ). Recall that group composition changes in every 
round among those who selected the random matching protocol. 훿random would coin-
cide with 훿partner in the (somewhat unlikely) case that only one group selects the ran-
dom matching protocol and the members of this specific group are aware of the fact 
that they are the only group that selected that matching protocol; in any other situa-
tion, 훿random is always greater than 훿partner . This suggests that subjects’ incentives to 
deviate are smaller with partner matching than in the random matching protocol. We 
can therefore summarize the difference in subjects’ contribution behavior as follows:
Summary 3: Any given symmetric contribution situation is more easily attained 
in the partner matching than in the random matching protocol.
Summary 3 suggests that the average contribution in groups that select the part-
ner matching protocol would be higher than that in groups that select the random 
matching protocol.
As already discussed in Sect. 1, we cannot provide definite predictions as to which 
of the two matching protocols groups select, although a larger fraction of studies 
seems to suggest that more groups would select the partner matching protocol.
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I also note that, notwithstanding Summary 1, subjects’ contribution behavior 
under the partner matching protocol may be stronger in the ENDO-M and ENDO-
U treatments than in the EXO treatment, because voting for the partner matching 
protocol may serve as a signal that the subject wishes to forgo the high temptation to 
deviate under random matching (Aimone et al. 2013),16 and thus as a signal of their 
future contribution behavior (e.g. Tyran and Feld 2006). The democracy premium 
may also be present when groups collectively implement the partner matching pro-
tocol (Dal Bó et al. 2010; Kamei 2016; Markussen et al. 2014; Sutter et al. 2010; 
Tyran and Feld 2006).17 If the signaling effects and/or the democracy premium are 
significant, then, for example, beliefs about others’ contributions formed by subjects 
under the partner matching protocol might be higher in the ENDO-U and ENDO-
M treatments than in the EXO treatment. The positive effect of the democracy pre-
mium may even be compounded if democracy directly affects subjects’ cooperation 
behaviors through a channel other than beliefs (e.g., Kamei 2016).
4  Results
The experiment was conducted at the Centre for Experimental Economics (EXEC) 
laboratory at the University of York in the United Kingdom from October to Decem-
ber 2015 and October 2016.18 All subjects were students at the University of York. 
In total, nine sessions—three for each treatment, were conducted. Each session con-
sisted of five or six groups (20 or 24 subjects). Subjects voluntarily registered for 
and participated in the experiment. They were recruited by solicitation messages 
sent through hroot (Bock et al. 2014). No subject participated in more than one ses-
sion. Client computers were separated from each other by three sufficiently tall par-
titions (one for the front and two for the sides). No communication was permitted 
throughout the experiment.
All experimental procedures except the instructions and comprehension questions 
were computerized. They were programmed in the z-Tree software (Fischbacher 
2007). All instructions were neutrally framed (see Appendix A). Any words with 
positive or negative connotation (e.g., contribute, public goods) were avoided. At 
the onset of the experiment, the instructions were handed out to subjects and read 
aloud by the researcher. Subjects were then asked to answer comprehension ques-
tions to check their understanding of the experiment. At the end of the experiment, 
each subject was privately paid based on their interaction outcomes. The average 
per-subject payoff (including £3 for show-up fee) was 15.85 pounds sterling.
16 See Grimm and Mengel (2009) and Schneider and Weber (2013) also.
17 The presence of the democracy premium may depend on the distribution of income. All the papers 
cited here used setups where endowments were the same among subjects. The democracy premium was 
not observed in Kamei (2018), where subjects democratically selected a public goods game or a lottery 
contest when endowments were unequally distributed among the subjects.
18 I first conducted the ENDO-U and EXO treatments in 2015. I then conducted the ENDO-M treatment 
as the second experiment in October 2016.
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4.1  Subjects’ voting behavior
I first examine subjects’ vote outcomes in order to address the first research question 
(people’s collective choice). First, the experimental results showed that most groups 
implemented the partner matching protocol from the first supergame (Table  1). 
Specifically, 15 out of 16 groups in each of the ENDO-U and ENDO-M treatments 
chose to play with the pre-assigned players for the full set of rounds in the first 
supergame. The percentages of groups that chose this option remained similar dur-
ing the five supergames in the ENDO-U treatment, except for the 3rd supergame 
in which the percentage was slightly lower.19 The number of these groups declined 
slightly after the first supergame in the ENDO-M treatment, but the numbers hov-
ered at high levels between ten and 13 groups during the 2nd to 5th supergames. The 
difference in the fraction of groups that selected the partner matching protocol is not 
significantly different between the two endogenous treatments in each supergame.20
Second, although we found overwhelming support for the partner matching pro-
tocol, the number of voting stages required for groups to agree on one of the two 
matching protocols differed substantially by group and session in the ENDO-U 
treatment (Part I in Appendix Table C.1). While 28.8% and 25.0% of groups reached 
unanimous agreement in the first and second voting stages, respectively, 32.5% of 
group decisions required at least five voting stages. Similarly, the number of sup-
ports for the partner matching protocol differs by groups under the majority rule 
(Part II in Appendix Table C.1). 23.8% of groups had all four members’ supports, 
while 46.3% and 25.0% of groups had three and two members’ supports, respec-
tively, in the ENDO-M treatment (the remaining 5% of groups had one support for 
the partner matching and instead implemented the random matching protocol).
Result 1 (i) Most groups implemented the partner matching protocol in each super-
game. (ii) Nevertheless, there was substantial variation across groups in the number 
of voting stages required to agree on the partner matching protocol in the ENDO-U 
treatment and the number of supports for that protocol in the ENDO-M treatment.
19 As an anonymous referee pointed out, some readers may think that if subjects experienced a large 
number of voting stages due to disagreement and ended up by selecting the partner matching protocol in 
a given supergame, in a later supergame the partner matching protocol might become a focal point and 
subjects may just vote for it quickly to avoid a lengthy voting process. Or worse, there may even emerge 
an experimenter demand effect that encourages subjects to vote for the partner matching protocol. There 
is no evidence in the data, however, to support this pattern (see Part I of Appendix Table C.1). The aver-
age numbers of voting stages required to reach a consensus were 3.31, 3.13, 4.56, 5.63, and 6.13 in the 
1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th and 5th supergames, respectively. The numbers of groups that reached a consensus in 
the very first voting stage were 5, 6, 3, 5, and 4 in the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th and 5th supergames, respectively.
20 p-values based on two-sided Fisher’s exact tests for the null that the fractions are equal for the two 
treatments are 1.000, 0.600, 0.685, 0.220, and 0.333 in the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th and 5th supergames, respec-
tively.
1 3
Cooperation and endogenous repetition in an infinitely repeated…
4.2  The impact of democracy
I now move on to identify the impact of democratic decision-making on subjects’ 
contribution behaviors.21 We usually need to take care of selection effects for this 
purpose (e.g., Tyran and Feld 2006; Dal Bó et al. 2010, 2015). The collective pref-
erence exhibited by almost all groups to commit to a longer partnership from the 
1st supergame [Result 1(i)], however, means that no subsample unrepresentative of 
the population emerges from the voting process in the ENDO-U or ENDO-M treat-
ment. This observation suggests that there is little concern of selection bias in the 
data, although I conducted some robustness checks nevertheless as explained later 
in this subsection.22 By contrast, it may be desirable to control for the possibility 
of correlated subject choices within sessions especially for the ENDO-U treatment 
since the duration of voting stages differed by session (Sect. 4.1). To address this 
possibility, I cluster standard errors at the session level when analyzing individual-
level data.
My method to identify the impact of democracy is to use the empirical strategies 
a and b discussed in Sect. 2. As expected, in each supergame, only the first round 
was the common period that occurred for all the six sessions in the ENDO-U and 
the EXO treatments.23 The same holds also for the six sessions in the ENDO-M 
and EXO treatments. Hence, I use round 1 behaviors in each supergame to compare 
contribution decisions between the ENDO-U and EXO treatments, and between the 
ENDO-M and EXO treatments.
Table  2 summarizes the average round 1 contribution amount by session, 
matching protocol and supergame. The average contribution in the 1st supergame 
is 10.97 points in the ENDO-U treatment when the groups selected the partner 
matching protocol. This is greater than the average contribution in the EXO treat-
ment (9.19 points). The large difference in the average contribution between the 
two treatments persists until the 5th supergame. The average contribution under 
the partner matching is even higher in the ENDO-M treatment—12.47 points in 
the first supergame and 10.27 points on average across the five supergames. The 
average contributions in the ENDO-M treatment are 35.7, 30.4, 25.4, 36.6, and 
34.8% higher than those in the EXO treatment in the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th and 5th 
supergames, respectively.
21 Because average payoffs are the linear transformations of subjects’ average contribution amounts 
based on Eq. (1), results are the same even if payoff data are used instead.
22 Controlling for selection bias is required if a selection through voting occurs unlike Result 1(i). See 
Dal Bó, Foster and Putterman (2010) and Tyran and Feld (2006). Also see Dal Bó, Foster and Kamei 
(2015), who recently propose a new identification strategy for correcting selection bias in the case of 
majority voting.
23 The trends of subjects’ round-by-round action choices by supergame and by session are provided in 
Appendix Figure C.1. As anticipated, the realized length of each indefinitely repeated game differed by 
session and supergame as often seen in indefinitely repeated game experiments. For instance, the 1st 
supergame lasted for only one round in three out of the nine sessions conducted in this study.
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In order to ascertain the statistical significance of the impact of democracy, I con-
ducted a regression analysis. Columns (1) and (4), and columns (2) and (5) of Table 3 
report the estimation results when using data of the 1st supergame only (1st SG data, 
hereafter) and of all the five supergames (All SG data, hereafter), respectively. The 
dependent variable is subject i’s contribution amount to the public account in round 1. 
Only observations in groups which operated under the partner matching protocol were 
used. The independent variables include the Endo dummy variable, which equals 1 for 
the ENDO-U and ENDO-M treatments; and 0 for the EXO treatment. A tobit regres-
sion model is used for the estimation because subjects’ contribution amounts are cen-
sored at 0 and 20.24 Standard errors are clustered by session for all the specifications.25 
The specification in columns (1) and (4) includes only the Endo dummy, while in col-
umns (2) and (5), the supergame number variable (which equals 1, 2, 3, 4, or 5) is also 
included to control for the trend across the supergames. Further, in columns (2) and (5), 
the interaction term between the supergame number variable and the Endo dummy is 
included as the across-supergame trend may differ by the treatment. Three clear pat-
terns were found. First, letting subjects collectively choose the partner matching proto-
col helps enhance subjects’ contributions significantly in the first supergame, regardless 
of the voting rule used [see columns (1) and (4)]. Second, the across-supergame trends 
in contributions are not different between the ENDO-U or ENDO-M treatment and the 
EXO treatment, and the positive effect of democratic decision-making persists across 
the supergames, regardless of the voting rule used [see columns (2) and (5)].26 Third, 
the positive impact of democracy is stronger when the majority rule, rather than the 
unanimity rule, is used (see the coefficient estimates of the Endo dummy).27
24 One drawback of using a tobit model is that there is no theoretically valid way to add individual ran-
dom effects on top of session clustering. An alternative method to address this concern is to adopt an 
ordered probit regression model because subjects’ choice set (contribution amount) is ordered: {0, 1, 2, 
…, 20}. The ordered probit method allows researchers to include both clustering and individual random 
effects. I estimated the same specifications using individual random effects ordered probit regression 
with standard errors clustered by session ID as a robustness check. The results, found in Appendix Table 
C.2, are qualitatively similar to those in Table 3. As a further robustness check, I also ran a linear regres-
sion while including both session clustering and individual random effects, which again finds results 
qualitatively similar to those of Table 3 (the results are omitted to conserve space).
25 Clustering by session is especially required for the All SG data because the random matching protocol 
is used for matching across the supergames.
26 Results are similar when two-sided session average Mann–Whitney tests are used. The average round 
1 contribution in the 1st supergame under the partner matching protocol is significantly higher in the 
ENDO-U or ENDO-M treatment than in the EXO treatment (p = 0.0495). The difference in the average 
contribution amount is also statistically significant between the endogenous and exogenous treatments 
when we use average round 1 contributions across all of the five supergames (p = 0.0495).
27 The difference in the coefficient estimate of the Endo dummy between columns (1) and (4) is signifi-
cant (p = 0.0020, two-sided F test), although the difference between columns (2) and (5) is not significant 
(p = 0.1787, two-sided F test).
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Table 2  Contribution amounts in each supergame
The numbers in parentheses are the numbers of groups that operated in the regime in the first column of 
the corresponding row. The average contributions were calculated using subjects’ round 1 behaviors in 
each supergame and session
1st SG 2nd SG 3rd SG 4th SG 5th SG All supergames
(a) The ENDO-U treatment
 Session 1
  Partner matching 10.96 (6) 9.95 (5) 8.67 (3) 6.67 (6) 5.96 (6) 8.36
  Random matching N/A (0) 4.75 (1) 5.50 (3) N/A (0) N/A (0) 5.31
 Session 2
  Partner matching 11.19 (4) 11.35 (5) 10.00 (5) 8.94 (4) 9.85 (5) 10.28
  Random matching 0.25 (1) N/A (0) N/A (0) 0.50 (1) N/A (0) 0.38
 Session 3
  Partner matching 10.80 (5) 9.45 (5) 6.08 (3) 8.25 (4) 9.50 (4) 9.07
  Random matching N/A (0) N/A (0) 2.75 (2) 2.00 (1) 0.75 (1) 2.06
 Average
  Partner matching 10.97 (15) 10.25 (15) 8.57 (11) 7.77 (14) 8.20 (15) 9.20
  Random matching 0.25 (1) 4.75 (1) 4.40 (5) 1.25 (2) 0.75 (1) 3.03
(b) The ENDO-M treatment
 Session 7
  Partner matching 12.44 (4) 9.44 (4) 6.83 (3) 6.42 (3) 7.00 (3) 8.72
  Random matching 9.00 (1) 3.25 (1) 5.88 (2) 11.25 (2) 6.00 (2) 7.31
 Session 8
  Partner matching 11.50 (5) 11.25 (4) 9.06 (4) 12.17 (3) 10.31 (4) 10.83
  Random matching N/A (0) 7.75 (1) 4.75 (1) 4.75 (2) 1.25 (1) 4.65
 Session 9
  Partner matching 13.29 (6) 11.20 (5) 10.42 (6) 9.31 (4) 9.40 (5) 10.87
  Random matching N/A (0) 6.50 (1) N/A (0) 8.75 (2) 5.00 (1) 7.25
 Average
  Partner matching 12.47 (15) 10.67 (13) 9.17 (13) 9.30 (10) 9.10 (12) 10.27
  Random matching 9.00 (1) 5.83 (3) 5.50 (3) 8.25 (6) 4.56 (4) 6.51
(c) The EXO treatment (partner match-
ing)
 Session 4 8.29 (6) 8.42 (6) 7.54 (6) 7.96 (6) 6.67 (6) 7.78 (6)
 Session 5 9.58 (6) 6.83 (6) 6.42 (6) 5.67 (6) 6.17 (6) 6.93 (6)
 Session 6 9.80 (5) 9.50 (5) 8.10 (5) 6.80 (5) 7.55 (5) 8.35 (5)
 Average 9.19 (17) 8.18 (17) 7.31 (17) 6.81 (17) 6.75 (17) 7.65 (17)
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Subjects’ contribution amounts were very different between groups that selected 
the partner matching protocol and those that selected the random matching protocol. 
The average contribution for the latter was significantly lower than for the former 
(Table 2).28 This finding is consistent with Summary 3.29
Result 2 (i) Regardless of which voting rule was used, subjects contributed sig-
nificantly more when they democratically implemented the partner matching 
protocol, compared with when they were exogenously given the same matching 
protocol. This difference remained similar from the first to the last supergame. 
(ii) The impact of democracy is stronger under the majority rule than under the 
unanimity rule. (iii) Subjects contributed significantly more in the partner match-
ing than in the random matching protocol.
These results are robust even if we consider the possibility of small selection 
effects. For instance, as discussed with Table  1, one group selected the random 
matching protocol in the 1st supergame in each of the ENDO-U and ENDO-M 
treatments. One might assume that the least cooperative groups selected the ran-
dom matching protocol and thus the effect of democracy seen in Tables 2 and 3 may 
be overestimated. As a robustness check, I conducted two further regressions with 
specifications the same as those in columns (1) and (4) of Table 3, while excluding 
one group with the lowest contribution amount in the EXO treatment. As shown in 
Appendix Table C.4, it was found that the Endo dummy variable has a significantly 
positive coefficient as in columns (1) and (4) of Table  3. I likewise conducted a 
robustness check for the results of columns (2) and (5) by dropping groups with the 
lowest contribution amounts in other supergames of the EXO treatment and found 
that the Endo dummy still obtains a significant coefficient (the details are included 
in Appendix Table C.4).
Result 2 (iv) Results 2(i) and (ii) are not due to possible selection effects.
As shown in Part I of Appendix Table C.1, some groups did not unanimously 
agree on one of the two protocols even in the last voting stage (i.e., the 20th voting 
stage). Results in Table 3 change little even if we exclude these groups from regres-
sions in the ENDO-U treatment (see Appendix Table C.3 for the estimation results).
29 As an anonymous referee pointed out, another possible experimental design could be to let subjects 
play the game under the partner matching or random matching before making a voting decision, because 
some subjects may not appreciate beforehand the beneficial effects of having fixed partners. Result 1(i), 
however, implies that such experiences are not necessary for subjects to select the partner matching pro-
tocol.
28 We compared the average contributions between the two matching protocols using data from all 
supergames considering Result 1(i). Tobit regressions with standard errors clustered by session ID find 
that the differences are significant at p = 0.017 (p = 0.041) and p = 0.065 (p = 0.002) when only data in 
round 1 (data in all rounds) are used in the ENDO-U and ENDO-M treatments, respectively. Recall that 
most groups selected the partner matching protocol. Although we cannot rule out the effect of selection 
bias, this estimation result suggests that subjects who selected random matching may have believed that 
more than one group selected that matching option and have acted differently from under the partner 
matching protocol.
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A question not answered so far by relying on empirical strategies a and b is how 
the impact of democracy transits within the supergames. One advantage of the 
experimental design was that subjects interact repeatedly within supergames. This 
design feature may enable us to address this additional question. Although not all 
groups played more than one round in each supergame, on average over half of 
groups did go through three rounds within supergames.30 Specifically, on average 
78.4%, 64.7%, 48.2%, and only 30.3% of groups reached round 2, round 3, round 
4 and round 5, respectively, as outcomes of random draws in the continuation rule. 
Hence, I study the persistence of the impact of democracy using data from the first 
three rounds within supergames.31
I employ a method to perform a regression analysis as in Table  3 with the same 
specifications just studied based on strategies a and b, except that the Rounds within 
supergames variable and its interaction with the Endo dummy are additionally 
included as independent variables [columns (3) and (6) of Table 3]. First, the esti-
mation results show that the Rounds within supergames variable has a significantly 
negative coefficient. This is natural because an instance of defection usually spreads 
across the group over time as some subjects act according to conditional coopera-
tion or punishment strategies in infinitely repeated game interactions (e.g., Camera 
and Casari 2009; Kamei 2017). Note that subjects must withhold cooperation in my 
design to punish uncooperative partners because they do not have another punish-
ment stage. Second, and more importantly, the additional interaction term has a sig-
nificantly negative coefficient when the unanimity rule is used, whereas it does not 
when the majority rule is used. This suggests that the premium from endogenous 
adoption of partner matching diminishes from round to round under the unanimity 
rule, but it persists over the rounds under the majority rule. This result strengthens 
Result 2(ii).
Result 3 Despite Result 2(i), the within-supergame trend for the impact of democ-
racy differs by voting rule. Specifically, the positive impact persists over rounds 
under the majority rule, but diminishes from round to round under the unanimity 
rule in a given supergame.
4.3  Subjects’ beliefs on their peers’ action choices
A possible underlying factor that may be driving Result 2 is the effect of demo-
cratic decision-making on enhancing beliefs as to peers’ cooperation behaviors. This 
effect stems from two potential sources: the effect of voting as an indirect signal of 
31 Although the number of observations increases if we use data up to round 4, we then require greater 
reliance on a subset of groups (on average a little over 50% of groups did not reach round 4). Neverthe-
less we note that results I will present now little change even when we use data up to round 4 within 
supergames.
30 We cannot compare within-supergame trends between the ENDO-U or ENDO-M treatment and the 
EXO treatment by only using the data from the first supergame, because in the EXO treatment the super-
game lengths were one round for two sessions and two rounds for the other session in that supergame.
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cooperation (e.g., Tyran and Feld 2006) and the direct effect that democracy has on 
people’s beliefs (a democracy premium).
I first studied how subjects’ beliefs evolved from supergame to supergame 
(Table 4). The average beliefs in the 1st supergame formed by subjects who imple-
mented the partner matching protocol in the ENDO-U and ENDO-M treatments 
were higher than those formed by subjects who were exogenously given the same 
protocol in the EXO treatment. The differences are significant (see columns (1) and 
(3) in Table 5 and Table C.5). This is suggestive of the idea that democratic deci-
sion-making positively affects people’s beliefs.32 On the other hand, average beliefs 
under the partner matching protocol in the ENDO-U treatment declined rapidly 
from supergame to supergame, and settled at a similar level to the EXO treatment 
in the 3rd to 5th supergames (see again Table  4). A regression analysis indicates 
that the average beliefs across all supergames are at most weakly significantly dif-
ferent between the ENDO-U and EXO treatments when partner matching is in effect 
(column (2), Table 5).33 This rapid decline of beliefs in the ENDO-U treatment is 
in contrast with subjects’ action choices: subjects’ average contribution amounts 
did not decline very quickly with the democratic decision process (Table 2). In the 
ENDO-M treatment, although the average beliefs were always higher than those in 
the EXO treatment (Table 4), the former is not significantly different from the latter 
according to a regression analysis due to high variation [column (4), Table 5]. This 
is in contrast with subjects’ strong contribution behaviors displayed in the ENDO-M 
treatment [columns (4) to (6) in Table 3]. These observations on beliefs and action 
choices provide tentative evidence that democratic decision-making itself have 
directly affected the subjects’ contribution behavior via a channel other than beliefs 
(e.g., Dal Bó et al. 2010; Kamei 2016).
In order to formally explore the role of subjects’ beliefs on their decisions to con-
tribute, I conducted regressions that included subjects’ beliefs as an additional inde-
pendent variable in the same specifications as Table  3. In this analysis, I further 
added the interaction term between the belief variable and the Endo dummy variable 
as an independent variable to analyze how the correlation between subject’s own 
32 As an anonymous referee pointed out, this result may have been caused by two possibilities: (a) voting 
for the partner matching protocol raises subjects’ beliefs, or (b) merely optimistic subjects vote for the 
partner matching option. To exclude possibility (b), I calculated the fraction of subjects who believed 
that peers contributed more than ten points or contributed the full endowment (20 points), out of the 
total number of subjects in a given treatment, not out of the number of subjects under partner matching. 
The fractions of those who believed peers’ contribution of more than ten points (20 points) were 34.38% 
(14.06%), 43.75% (18.75%) and 26.47% (7.35%) in the ENDO-U, ENDO-M and EXO treatments, 
respectively. These calculations are consistent with the pattern that possibility (a) implies. The difference 
in the fraction of those who believed their peers’ contribution to be more than ten points (20 points) is 
significant at two-sided p = 0.0373 (0.0507) in the ENDO-M treatment, while it is not significant in the 
ENDO-U treatment. This suggests that the impact of factor (a) is stronger in the ENDO-M than in the 
ENDO-U treatment, which is consistent with other analyses which will be reported in Sect. 4.5.
33 This weak significant result is not robust. The Endo dummy fails to obtain a significant coefficient if 
an ordered probit regression model is used. The average beliefs across all the supergames are also not 
significantly different between the ENDO-U and EXO treatments according to two-sided Mann–Whitney 
tests (p value = 0.2752).
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contribution amounts and beliefs differ by the presence of the democratic decision 
process. Two interesting patterns were found. First, as shown in Table 6, the Endo 
dummy either no longer obtains a significant coefficient or has a much smaller point 
estimate (even if significant), once the beliefs are controlled for. The variable for 
subjects’ beliefs obtains a significantly positive coefficient in every specification. 
This implies that one driver for the highly significant impact of democracy seen in 
Result 2 could be subjects’ more optimistic beliefs in the ENDO-U and ENDO-M 
treatments than in the EXO treatment. Second, democracy directly affects subjects’ 
Table 4  Beliefs on matched partners’ average contribution amounts in each supergame
The numbers in parentheses are the numbers of groups that operated in the regime in the first column of 
the corresponding row as a result of voting
1st SG 2nd SG 3rd SG 4th SG 5th SG All supergames
(a) The ENDO-U treatment
 Session 1
  Partner matching 11.63 (6) 11.10 (5) 7.58 (3) 6.92 (6) 6.83 (6) 8.87
  Random matching N/A (0) 7.75 (1) 4.58 (3) N/A (0) N/A (0) 5.38
 Session 2
  Partner matching 10.25 (4) 8.40 (5) 7.10 (5) 6.00 (4) 6.50 (5) 7.61
  Random matching 3.25 (1) N/A (0) N/A (0) 0.75 (1) N/A (0) 2.00
 Session 3
  Partner matching 11.15 (5) 10.90 (5) 7.75 (3) 7.44 (4) 7.44 (4) 9.10
  Random matching N/A (0) N/A (0) 8.13 (2) 2.75 (1) 2.75 (1) 5.44
 Average
  Partner matching 11.10 (15) 10.13 (15) 7.41 (11) 6.80 (14) 6.88 (15) 8.57
  Random matching 3.25 (1) 7.75 (1) 6.00 (5) 1.75 (2) 2.75 (1) 4.34
(b) The ENDO-M treatment
 Session 7
  Partner matching 10.00 (4) 8.44 (4) 8.33 (3) 6.83 (3) 7.58 (3) 8.35
  Random matching 5.00 (1) 7.25 (1) 4.63 (2) 9.38 (2) 5.88 (2) 6.50
 Session 8
  Partner matching 11.65 (5) 10.88 (4) 10.13 (4) 8.58 (3) 10.88 (4) 10.58
  Random matching N/A (0) 8.25 (1) 5.00 (1) 6.88 (2) 2.50 (1) 5.90
 Session 9
  Partner matching 13.42 (6) 12.1 (5) 9.92 (6) 8.25 (4) 6.50 (5) 10.23
  Random matching N/A (0) 5.25 (1) N/A (0) 7.25 (2) 8.75 (1) 7.13
 Average
  Partner matching 11.72 (15) 10.30 (13) 9.47 (13) 8.36 (10) 8.27 (12) 9.67
  Random matching 6.00 (1) 7.40 (3) 6.30 (3) 6.39 (6) 6.50 (4) 6.47
(c) The EXO treatment (partner matching)
 Session 4 9.63 (6) 9.67 (6) 8.04 (6) 6.67 (6) 7.29 (6) 8.26
 Session 5 8.83 (6) 8.17 (6) 7.67 (6) 4.46 (6) 4.58 (6) 6.74
 Session 6 11.10 (5) 9.40 (5) 8.35 (5) 8.50 (5) 6.60 (5) 8.79
 Average 9.78 (17) 9.06 (17) 8.00 (17) 6.43 (17) 6.13 (17) 7.88
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contribution behaviors positively through a channel other than beliefs in the ENDO-
M treatment, the treatment with the stronger effect of democratic decision-making, 
as indicated by the positive and significant coefficient on the Endo dummy [see col-
umn (6)].34
Result 4 (i) Beliefs on interaction peers’ contribution amounts formed by subjects 
who implemented the partner matching protocol in the ENDO-U and ENDO-M 
treatments were significantly higher than those formed by subjects who were given 
the same protocol in the EXO treatment in the 1st supergame. (ii) Result 2(i) was 
partly caused by subjects’ beliefs enhanced by the endogenous adoption of part-
ner matching. However, (iii) democracy also directly affected subjects’ contribu-
tion behaviors through channels other than beliefs, particularly in the ENDO-M 
treatment.
Table 5  The effects of democratic decision-making on the formation of subjects’ beliefs
Dependent variable: Subject i’s belief on his or her three interaction partners’ average contribution 
amount in a given supergame
Tobit regressions with robust standard errors clustered by session ID. As for the ENDO-U and ENDO-
M treatments, only observations in groups which selected the partner matching protocol were used. The 
numbers in parentheses are standard errors
As a robustness check, I also conducted individual random-effects ordered probit regressions with stand-
ard errors clustered by session ID. The Endo dummies in the specification of columns (1) and (3) both 
obtain significantly positive coefficients at the 5% level. The Endo dummies in the specifications of col-
umns (2) and (4) both fail to obtain significant coefficients. The results are included in Appendix Table 
C.5
*, **, and *** indicate significance at the 0.10 level, at the 0.05 level and at the 0.01 level, respectively
Voting rule Unanimity rule Majority rule
Data 1st supergame All supergames 1st supergame All supergames
Independent variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
(i) Endo dummy {= 1 for the 
ENDO-U and ENDO-M treat-
ments; 0 for the EXO treatment}
1.61** 
(0.74)
1.40* 
(0.77)
2.59* 
(1.41)
2.14 
(1.81)
(ii) Supergame number {= 1, 2, 3, 
4, 5}
– − 1.03*** 
(0.14)
– − 1.04 
(0.14)
Interaction term: (i) × (ii) – − 0.24 
(0.17)
– − 0.064 
(0.53)
Constant 9.85*** 
(0.66)
11.0*** 
(0.37)
9.86*** 
(0.67)
11.0*** 
(0.38)
# of observations 128 620 128 592
# of left-censored observations 4 22 5 21
# of right-censored observations 14 23 17 34
Log pseudo likelihood − 373.5 − 1764.6 − 372.1 − 1719.5
34 Whether this holds also for the ENDO-U treatment is ambiguous because while the Endo dummy has 
a significantly positive coefficient in column (3), the interaction term between the Endo dummy and the 
belief variable has a significantly negative coefficient.
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As is usually the case in this kind of study, we cannot disentangle the effects on 
beliefs [Result 4(ii)] into signaling effects and democracy premiums. Neverthe-
less, Result 4(iii) suggests that democracy premiums should be part of the story that 
accounts for Result 2 in the ENDO-M treatment.
4.4  The process to implement the partner matching protocol and subjects’ 
contribution behavior
As mentioned earlier, the number of voting stages required to reach a consensus in 
the ENDO-U treatment, as well as the number of supporters for the partner matching 
protocol (“Y-voter,” hereafter) in the ENDO-M treatment, differed by group [Result 
1(ii)]. In Sect. 4.4, I explore how the differences in agreement pattern affected sub-
jects’ belief formation and action choices.
Figure 2 reports the average contributions and beliefs under the partner match-
ing protocol by the number of voting stages spent in the ENDO-U treatment, or 
by the number of the Y-voters in the ENDO-M treatment.35 Two clear patterns 
were found regarding subjects’ contribution behaviors. First, subjects’ contribu-
tion amounts in the ENDO-U treatment were clearly higher when they underwent 
a small number of voting stages to reach a consensus, compared with subjects in 
the EXO treatment [Panel I(a)]. They contributed much less, however, when they 
instead had to undergo all 20 voting stages, compared with subjects in the EXO 
treatment. Second, the higher number of supports a group had for implement-
ing the partner matching protocol in the ENDO-M treatment, the higher average 
contribution they achieved [Panel II(a)]. Especially, when all four members sup-
ported the partner matching protocol, the average contributions were 58.6% and 
60.3% higher than those in the EXO treatment in the 1st SG data and All SG data, 
respectively. These differences are statistically significant at the 1% level. Notice, 
however, that the differences in the average contribution between the ENDO-M 
and EXO treatments drastically shrink when not all members vote for the partner 
matching protocol. Nevertheless, the average contributions in the ENDO-M treat-
ment never become lower than those in the EXO treatment, unlike in the ENDO-
U treatment.
Result 5 (i) The smaller the number of voting stages that a group underwent to 
achieve a consensus, the larger the average contribution that the group achieved in 
the ENDO-U treatment. (ii) The higher the number of supports a group had when 
implementing the partner matching protocol, the higher the average contribution 
that the group achieved in the ENDO-M treatment.
Subjects’ beliefs are reported in Panels (b) of Fig. 2. It first indicates that in the 
ENDO-U treatment, regardless of the number of voting stages to reach a consensus, 
35 See Supplementary Appendix Table C.6 for the statistical tests that check whether the differences 
between the ENDO-U or ENDO-M treatment and the EXO treatment are significant.
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democratic decision-making enhances subjects’ beliefs in the first supergame. This 
suggests that the impact of voting on beliefs was present, regardless of the duration 
of voting, under the unanimity rule. Recall, however, that subjects in groups that 
underwent the full set of voting stages contributed much less (panel I(a) in Fig. 2). 
This implies that the democratic decision process alone is not enough to persuade 
(a) Average contribution amounts (b) Average beliefs 
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Fig. 2  Average contributions and beliefs under the partner matching protocol by the voting pattern. 
Notes: cEXO ( cbeliefEXO  ) is the average contribution (average belief) in the EXO treatment in panel a (panel 
b). #1There are zero cases in which the number of supports was two and the computer randomly imple-
mented the partner matching protocol in the first supergame
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some very uncooperative subjects to cooperate. The result is similar to Dal Bó et al. 
(2010) and Kamei (2016) where majority rules were used. In Dal Bó et al. (2010) 
and Kamei (2016), only supporters of a policy exhibited the positive effects from 
democratic decision-making. If we use data from all supergames, we observed posi-
tive correlations between subjects’ beliefs and the numbers of voting stages spent on 
implementing the partner matching protocol [see again Panel I(b)].
Second, in the ENDO-M treatment, the patterns of subjects’ beliefs are almost 
the same as those of their contribution behaviors in both the data from the first 
supergame and from all supergames. These patterns seem to imply that voting has a 
stronger functioning for a cooperative subject to send a signal of future cooperation 
in the ENDO-M than in the ENDO-U treatment.
Result 6 (i) Democratic decision-making enhanced subjects’ beliefs, regardless of 
how many voting stages they underwent for an agreement, in the first supergame in 
the ENDO-U treatment. (ii) The higher number of Y-voters a group had, the more 
likely group members believed that their peers were to contribute large amounts in 
the ENDO-M treatment.
4.5  Subjects’ belief formation and decision to contribute by the voter type
We found that the impact of democracy is stronger when the majority rule, rather 
than the unanimity rule, is applied [Result 2(ii) and Result 3]. Lastly, I will explore 
possible causes for this result by studying how subjects’ voting preferences and the 
voting patterns in the group are linked to their decisions to contribute.
In the ENDO-U treatment, subjects continued to vote until they reached a consensus. 
I first classified subjects into those who voted for or against the partner matching 
protocol in the first voting stage (“initial Y-voters” and “initial N-voters,” hereafter), 
and then investigated how the duration of voting stages affected their belief forma-
tion and decisions to contribute under the partner matching (Panel I of Table  7). 
Two interesting patterns were found. First, the initial Y-voters on average contrib-
uted larger amounts than the initial N-voters did, but the difference is not significant 
when we use the round 1 behaviors in the 1st SG or all SG data [columns (1a) and 
(2a) in Panel I(a)]. In addition, the beliefs formed by the initial Y-voters are not sig-
nificantly different from those by the initial N-voters in the first supergame [column 
(1a) in Panel I(b)] This seem to suggest that initial votes casted by subjects were 
not precise indicators of subjects’ willingness to contribute. This also implies that 
voters’ signaling effects may have been weak in the ENDO-U treatment.36 Second, 
36 As an anonymous referee pointed out, the unanimity rule in that all voters must agree on one match-
ing option by repeated voting may have made subjects behave strategically, as has been shown in jury 
decisions to convict (Guarnaschelli et al. 2000) or in voter turnout decisions in election (Battaglini et al. 
2010). Possible strategic voting may partly account for these small differences in behaviors between the 
initial Y-voters and the initial N-voters and also for Results 2(ii) and 3.
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the larger number of voting stages that a subject went through, the smaller amounts 
she believed that their peers would contribute and the smaller amounts she herself 
contributed to the public account.37 This holds, regardless of whether a subject is 
an initial Y-voter or an initial N-voter, except for the belief formation by the initial 
N-voters in the 1st supergame.38 The effects are strong in all specifications. This 
suggests that subjects interpret a short (long) duration of voting stage as their peers’ 
high (low) willingness to contribute.
Result 7 (i) The larger number of voting stages a subject experienced in the ENDO-
U treatment, the smaller amounts she believed that their peers would contribute and 
the smaller amounts she herself contributed.
Subjects cast votes once in each supergame in the ENDO-M treatment. I denote 
subjects who voted against the partner matching protocol (those who are not Y-vot-
ers) as the “N-voters.” Two clear patterns were found (Panel II of Table 7). First, the 
Y-voters contributed by far larger amounts than N-voters did [Panel II(a)]. This sug-
gests that unlike the ENDO-U treatment, subjects’ votes in the ENDO-M treatment 
were clearly linked to their decisions to contribute and thus were presumably clear 
signals of their inclinations to cooperate. This interpretation can also be seen in the 
data from beliefs. The Y-voters formed significantly higher beliefs on the peers’ con-
tribution behaviors than the N-voters did, when the partner matching protocol was 
imposed in accord with their voting [Panel II(b)]. Second, the numbers of N-voters 
are on average negatively correlated with Y-voters’ decisions to contribute. Also, 
the Y-voters’ beliefs are negatively correlated with the number of N-voters in their 
group. These are similar to Result 7(i), although the correlations are not statistically 
significant for the majority of the specifications.
Result 7 (ii) The Y-voters formed much higher beliefs regarding the peers’ contribu-
tion behaviors and then contributed significantly more than the N-voters did under 
partner matching in the ENDO-M treatment.
As discussed in Result 1(i), the partner matching protocol received overwhelming 
supports from the first supergame. Nevertheless, subjects’ experiences in the pre-
vious supergame may make subjects re-consider which matching protocol to vote 
for in a given supergame. If subjects cast more honest preferences in voting in the 
ENDO-M than in the ENDO-U treatment, the past experiences may affect their 
38 The number of voting stages has a significantly positive coefficient for belief formation by the initial 
N-voters in the 1st supergame (column (1c) in panel I(b)). However this probably happened by chance 
due to small sample. This independent variable has a significantly negative coefficient if we use data 
from all supergames [column (2c) in panel I(b)].
37 I also conducted the same regression while controlling for the ratio of the average realized group 
contribution to i’s belief in the previous supergame. To include the recent experience variable as an 
independent variable, I restricted data to observations after the first supergame where groups operated 
under the partner matching protocol for two adjacent supergames. Although the number of available data 
diminishes, the number of voting stages has a significantly negative coefficient for the initial Y-voters’ 
decisions to contribute at the 1% level.
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voting behaviors more strongly in the former than in the latter treatment. As shown 
in Appendix Table C.7, the data confirm this conjecture. In both of the two endog-
enous treatments, the higher the average group contribution, relative to her belief, 
that subject i experienced under partner matching, the more likely that i was to vote 
for the partner matching protocol in the next supergame; but this relationship is sig-
nificant only for the ENDO-M treatment.
The pro-cooperation aspect that high credibility of subjects’ voting in the ENDO-
M treatment produced can also be checked by comparing (a) the groups with four 
Y-voters in that treatment with (b) the groups with four initial Y-voters in the 
ENDO-U treatment. As shown in Fig. 2, the former groups had much higher levels 
of beliefs and then achieved clearly higher levels of contribution than the latter.39
In summary, these analyses suggest that Results 2(ii) and 3 can be explained by 
the difference in subjects’ voting behaviors between the ENDO-U and ENDO-M 
treatments.
5  Conclusions
This paper explored whether people collectively prefer to play with each other in 
a partner matching, rather than a random matching, environment, and whether the 
democratic selection of the partner matching protocol mitigates subjects’ uncoop-
erative behaviors. My experiment, the framework of which is a linear public goods 
game, provided affirmative answers to both of the questions. First, most groups 
selected the partner matching protocol from the very first supergame. Second, sub-
jects’ levels of contributions were significantly higher when they decided to act 
under the partner matching protocol by voting than when they were given the same 
protocol exogenously. The data further indicated that the impact of democracy is 
not due to selection bias, but could be due to signals sent through voting and/or 
democracy premiums. The importance of democratic decision-making for beliefs 
and behavior is similar to recent findings in the experimental literature (e.g. Tyran 
and Feld 2006; Dal Bó et al. 2010; Kamei 2016; Sutter et al. 2010), and the evidence 
presented here is the first demonstration in the context of indefinitely repeated situ-
ations. The results were robust to the type of voting rule used: the unanimity rule or 
the majority rule.
Nevertheless, an interesting difference between the two voting rules was also 
found. The impact of voting on enhancing cooperation was stronger under the 
majority rule than under the unanimity rule. Moreover, the impact was well sus-
tained under the majority rule, but it diminished from round to round within super-
games under the unanimity rule. I acknowledge that there are many other voting 
39 The differences in average contribution between these two sets of groups are significant at two-sided 
p = 0.012, 0.028, and 0.001 when round 1 behaviors in the 1st supergame, and those in all supergames, 
and rounds 1–3 behaviors in all supergames, respectively, are used, according to tobit regressions. The 
differences in average belief between these two sets of groups are significant at two-sided p = 0.001, and 
0.002 when beliefs in the 1st supergame and all supergames, respectively, are used, according to tobit 
regressions.
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rules, such as supermajority rule. How the strength of the democracy effect differs 
by other voting rule remains an interesting avenue for future research.
Recently Dal Bó et  al. (2017) show that voters may make systematic errors by 
underappreciating peers’ responses to a policy when undertaking voting decisions. 
In their experiment, the majority of subjects voted against levying a tax in a pris-
oner’s dilemma which makes cooperation a dominant strategy, even though the 
imposition of tax improves overall welfare.40 So, why did almost all groups in the 
present experiment select the partner matching protocol? There is a stark difference 
in the experimental design between Dal Bó et al. (2017) and my study. While the 
tax changed both the payoff matrix and the set of equilibria in Dal Bó et al. (2017), 
subjects in the current study were confronted with the same stage game for two vot-
ing options. Thus, arguably, predicting how subjects’ behaviors may change by the 
difference in the matching protocol may not have required high cognitive ability in 
this experiment. Recall that any symmetric, positive contribution situation is theo-
retically easier to achieve under the partner matching than under the random match-
ing protocol (Summary 3). The present experimental data in fact revealed that sub-
jects anticipate that their peers would contribute much more in the partner matching 
than in the random matching, and that the difference between the sizes of subjects’ 
beliefs and realized contributions is small. This implies that subjects may not always 
underappreciate equilibrium effects.
My experiment is also related to the literature on endogenous regrouping and 
partner choices. Past experimental studies, using finitely repeated setups, have 
shown that under certain conditions people improve cooperation in dilemmas if pro-
vided with an ability to choose with whom they interact. The findings of my experi-
ment imply that endogenous choices of players per se may partly account for the 
positive impact of endogenous group formation.
As a final remark, I note that my paper also has a broad implication for experi-
mental research on infinitely repeated dilemma games. Experimental work to inves-
tigate the possibility of cooperation is usually designed so that the basic rules of a 
game, such as continuation probability and matching protocol, are pre-determined 
without having endogenous features. This paper shows that letting subjects demo-
cratically select the partner matching protocol may enhance people’s willingness 
to contribute significantly in indefinitely repeated collective action dilemmas. This 
implication is that people’s behavior and equilibrium selection may be significantly 
affected by the way in which the basic rules of game are designed (endogenously 
versus exogenously).
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